

# Institutional Structures of Latin American Countries for Accession and Participation in the OECD

**Lucas da Silva Tasquetto\***

**Magali Favaretto Prieto Fernandes\*\***

**Milena da Fonseca Azevedo\*\*\***

**Abstract:** This article delineates the institutional structures established by Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica to facilitate their accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The analysis delves into the political and economic contexts surrounding each country's accession process, identifying key institutions and stakeholders domestic reforms required, and particular initiatives from each country, including institutional innovations and adapted procedures. Notably, each country exhibits unique institutional frameworks and adjustments, with varying prominence given to individuals and governmental entities based on constitutional, legal, and political-administrative configurations. We argue that, despite the uniqueness of each process, from an institutional standpoint, decisions concerning accession and the management of the process predominantly revolve around the Presidency and entities corresponding to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with variations in the preponderance of these bodies, and their leadership and coordination roles. Framing entry into the OECD primarily as a technical matter tends to justify the central role of the Ministries of Finance and affiliated bodies within the Presidency, aligned with the OECD's liberal approach. Moreover, accession to the OECD often complements and/or legitimizes processes of trade openness and structural reforms, spurring consolidation of factions within domestic institutions.

**Keywords:** OECD; Latin America; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Mexico; institutions.

---

\* Universidade Federal do ABC (UFABC), São Bernardo do Campo - SP, Brazil; [lucastasquetto@gmail.com](mailto:lucastasquetto@gmail.com) ORCID: 0000-0002-9230-5359

\*\* Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), São Paulo - SP, Brazil; [magalifavaretto@gmail.com](mailto:magalifavaretto@gmail.com) ORCID: 0000-0003-0254-0775

\*\*\* Universidade de São Paulo (USP), São Paulo - SP, Brazil; [milenafazevedo@gmail.com](mailto:milenafazevedo@gmail.com) ORCID: 0009-0008-8863-7327

## Introduction

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) holds a pivotal role in global economic governance. It has significantly contributed to extending the scope of the liberal international order beyond the limited circle of United States allies during the Cold War era (Chessé and Verdun 2023). The OECD's influence goes beyond shaping national economic policies; it also fosters the formation of 'communities of influence,' reshaping mindsets in economic management, and their underlying ideologies (Woodward 2010: 71). Leimgruber and Schmelzer (2023: 17) characterize the OECD as a 'warden of liberal capitalism,' dedicated to defending, promoting, and monitoring capitalist economies. Within this framework, specific modes of cooperation can resolve the internal contradictions of liberal capitalism.

The OECD stands as a distinct international organization. Despite comprising only 38 members, currently, over 100 countries engage with the institution in various capacities, albeit sometimes limited to specific domains. The regulations and policies governing access have dynamically evolved alongside the organization's shifting objectives and roles in global governance (Woodward 2022). The journey from its inception as a solely European entity designated for managing Marshall Plan funds to its present pluralistic, yet not universally inclusive, nature denotes significant changes. Initially inward-focused during the Cold War era, it progressively transitioned into an institution aspiring to global influence (OECD 2004). In 1990, the OECD initiated the inclusion of non-members as guests in committee meetings and projects. Post-1994, its scope nearly doubled, evolving into an organization encompassing nations from nearly every continent, except Africa.

Amidst the organization's expansion, the inclusion of Latin American members, coupled with the incorporation of European countries, sparked a 'sequenced process of regional outreach' (Mello 2022). Mexico joined the organization in 1994, followed by Chile in 2010. Argentina, Brazil, and Peru applied for OECD accession in 2017. Subsequently, Colombia concluded its accession process in 2020, followed by Costa Rica in 2021.

Despite Brazil's longstanding association with the OECD since the 1990s, its engagement has witnessed varying intensities, influenced by political orientations of successive Brazilian governments (Oliveira 2023). The nation's pursuit of full OECD membership became a pivotal focus during the tenures of Michel Temer (2016-2018) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022), centred in the Chief of Staff's Office (*Ministério da Casa Civil*) and the Ministry of Economy. There is a basic (canonical) model implicit in accession advocacy (Baumann 2021: 33) that extends beyond the Brazilian candidacy and echoes in other Latin American endeavours. In the context of OECD directives, this model serves as an 'anchor' (Braga 2021) or an inducer (Cozendey 2017) of liberalizing reforms in the fields of trade, finance, and investments.

Regardless of exerting profound influence in international economic governance, the OECD remains one of the least studied international organizations, particularly when compared to post-war institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Until recently, research focusing on the OECD's internal deliberations, its evolving role in global governance,

and its impact on post-global financial crisis regulatory frameworks has been scarce (Ecclestone 2011). Chessé and Verdun (2023: 23), for instance, argue that the OECD has remained one of the ‘blind spots’ in International Political Economy. Addressing these issues, Mello (2022: 3) argues that ‘the perspective of studies on global governance offers significant analytical gains for examining the interaction between systemic and domestic dynamics.’

Considering the perspective of a country undergoing the accession process, such as Brazil, it is crucial to analyse the experiences of recent members like Colombia and Costa Rica alongside earlier entrants, Mexico and Chile, each amid distinct geopolitical contexts. Examining and delineating the institutional structures, political contexts, and strategies for OECD entry and subsequent engagement allows anticipation of potential challenges. This analysis aids in comprehending the reforms undertaken and grasping ongoing regional dynamics.

This article addresses two levels of interaction. The first examines the impact of developing countries joining the OECD on its role in global governance. The analysis centres on the organization itself, tracing its main transformations over time, outlining the essential prerequisites for entry established in the process. It also illustrates how the accession of developing countries can be viewed as a component of Western powers’ strategic approach to secure liberalizing concessions from new members (Azzi 2021). The second focuses on domestic and regional dynamics, exploring how these nations articulated their interests in OECD accession, organized themselves, and navigated intra-governmental disputes.

We argue that, institutionally, decisions concerning accession and the management of the process predominantly revolve around the Presidency and entities corresponding to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with variations in the preponderance of these bodies, and their leadership and coordination roles. Framing entry into the OECD primarily as a technical matter tends to justify the central role of the Ministries of Finance and affiliated bodies within the Presidency, thereby embracing a more liberal and cooperative approach toward the organization. In the analysed cases, accession to the OECD aimed to complement and/or legitimize processes of trade openness and structural reforms within the respective countries, consolidating factions inside domestic institutions favouring specific economic policies (Leimgruber and Schmelzer 2023).

After this introduction, section 1 presents the OECD’s expansion, and the involvement of developing countries, examining the transformations of the institution concerning these new forms of membership. Section 2 delves into the institutional structures adopted by Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica. It examines these structures in the sequence of the countries’ full membership in the OECD based on five attributes: i) the political and economic context of accession, both externally and domestically; ii) the primary objectives pursued by these countries through accession; iii) the key institutions and participants in the process; iv) the primary domestic reforms necessary to comply with OECD policies; and v) the unique features of each country, including institutional innovations, new practices, and adapted routines to meet the requirements of full

membership. Section 3 concludes the analysis of the four countries by demonstrating differences and similarities among them, as well as unique features.

This study builds on literature review and analysis of official documents concerning the OECD's redefinition and expansion, as well as the accession processes of Latin American countries. Additionally, between October and December 2022, the authors conducted semi-structured interviews with nine high-ranking negotiators from Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica. These negotiators were former members of their countries' delegations to the OECD, associated with different ministries. The interviews shed light on some aspects sometimes obscured in the literature and bring 'colours' to processes described earlier.

## **Reframing the OECD's role, its enlargement, and the involvement of developing countries**

After the Cold War, the OECD grappled with an identity crisis, seeking to define its role within the framework of global governance. On one hand, the collapse of the centralized planning model signalled a belief in the supremacy of capitalism and democracy as pivotal principles in global governance. On the other hand, the absence of an 'ideological adversary' challenged the OECD's purpose. Confronted with a shifting power balance, the primary challenge moved towards redistributing power among both member and non-member countries (Woodward 2022).

Beyond geopolitical reorganization, the OECD underwent a fundamental reevaluation of its core principles. Initially, its primary aim was to advocate for public policies directed towards economic growth. However, starting in the 1980s, its policies took a neoliberal turn, endorsing market liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. The departure from the Keynesian liberal ideology ('embedded liberalism') that initially shaped the OECD's formation (Ruggie 1982) marked a significant shift. Embracing the neoliberal ethos altered the cooperation model within the OECD, which had previously been centred on international policy coordination. This shift introduced a model pressuring states to adopt domestic policy changes.

Consequently, the OECD, which historically focused inward during the Cold War era, evolved into an institution aspiring to global influence (OECD 2004). The globalized economic landscape demanded a more nuanced understanding of the developing world. Thus, from 1990 onward, the OECD actively involved non-member countries in its committees and initiatives. The establishment of the Emerging Market Economy Forum in 1995 aimed to engage non-member states and foster dialogue with burgeoning markets in Asia and Latin America (Woodward 2022).

Despite the consensus among OECD members regarding its expansion, the strategy was cautiously implemented. Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes (2011) identified a 'symmetric association logic' of a pragmatic nature that was adopted, considering the interest of many Eastern European countries in joining the organization. The approach aimed to balance the interests between European and non-European countries, preventing a

potential excessive ‘Europeanization’ of the organization. Consequently, four European and two non-European countries were admitted: Mexico (1994), Czech Republic and Poland (1995), Hungary and South Korea (1996), and Slovakia (2000).

The expansion strategy, however, was not without controversy. Discussions on the pace, direction, sequence, and scope of the expansion, along with its impact on the OECD’s identity, prompted the formation of a Working Group on the Expansion Strategy. Their deliberations culminated in a report, endorsed by the Council in 2004, known as the ‘Noboru Report,’ which outlined the criteria for aspiring countries (OECD 2004a). The admission criteria outlined in the report include: i) the degree of the country’s alignment (like-mindedness) with the organization’s fundamental values; ii) relevance as a participant; iii) mutual benefits; and iv) global considerations related to maintaining overall balance among members and the geopolitical context. Although subsequent documents have introduced additional criteria to the accession process, the principles outlined in the Noboru Report remain pertinent to this day.

In 2006, the criteria established in the Noboru Report were formalized into a dedicated instrument (OECD 2006). Both these documents facilitated the accession processes of Chile, Estonia, Israel, Slovenia (in 2010), and Russia (interrupted in 2014). Simultaneously, in 2006, Angel Gurría, Mexico’s former Minister of Finance and Public Credit, assumed the role of Secretary-General, pledging to reshape the OECD into a global hub (Mahon and McBride 2008). Furthermore, in 2007, the OECD identified Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa as ‘key partners,’ aiming to engage major emerging economies through the ‘Enhanced Engagement Program’ (OECD 2007b). Except for Brazil, the program did not yield the anticipated outcomes.

In the subsequent year, Gurría’s tenure confronted its paramount challenge during the global financial crisis. The neoliberal paradigm previously advocated by the OECD came under intense criticism. Nonetheless, Gurría viewed this crisis as an opportunity to initiate changes, emphasizing that the incorporation of new members and assimilating the OECD’s knowledge base (*acquis*) represented ‘the most potent tool to extend the scope and influence of OECD values and standards’ (OECD 2019).

However, this crisis accelerated the shift of the global economic and political centre towards the East and South. In 2016, the Ministerial Council mandated the establishment of a task force for strategic deliberation on future growth and membership criteria. To reconcile contradictions in the expansion process and accommodate diverse interests, the OECD adopted alternative strategies in its engagements with countries. Subsequent to these adjustments, Latvia (2016), Lithuania (2018), Colombia (2020), and Costa Rica (2021) joined, preserving a balance between European and non-European nations while acknowledging unique characteristics within each accession process.

Despite ongoing transformations, there remains no consolidated document outlining all the criteria for the accession process. The decision to admit a new member is shaped by a combination of factors: i) principles derived from the Noboru Report; ii) principles outlined in the ‘50th Anniversary Vision Statement’ (OECD 2011); and iii) an assessment framework evaluating the ‘state of readiness,’ which encompasses the country’s capacity to navigate the accession process. This readiness assessment includes

alignment with fundamental values of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights; the presence of robust economic and governance institutions; an evaluation of economic performance over the past five years; and a high-level political commitment to membership obligations, demonstrated through an assessment of convergence and active participation in committees and peer review processes.

Since 2019, the OECD has been propelling a more comprehensive reform agenda anchored by a 'Global Relations Strategy.' This strategy aims 'to advocate and propagate OECD values, expanding the relevance and adoption of its standards and best practices globally' (OECD 2019). The strategy is based on three pillars: expanding membership, collaborating with non-member entities, and strengthening the OECD-G7-G20 alliance. To enhance engagement with a broad spectrum of non-member entities, the OECD has been cultivating and formalizing its relationship with the G20, utilizing this group as a strategic interface to engage with emerging powers from the Global South.

## **Different paces and contexts: Latin American countries' accession processes to full OECD membership**

The accession of Latin American countries into the OECD unfolded at different junctures, aligning with distinct 'waves' or phases of expansion within the OECD (Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes 2014; Davis 2016; Godinho 2017). Beyond the concept of 'waves,' which reflects the organization's institutional changes, literature also highlights a regional and sequential logic in Latin America. Colombia and Costa Rica's entry marked the initiation of this sequence, distinguishing their trajectory from the earlier cases of Mexico and Chile, which pursued more individualized paths toward candidacy (Mello 2020). We contend that noteworthy peculiarities characterize their accession processes. Each case exhibited distinctive structural applications and institutional adaptations, showcasing varying degrees of prominence among specific individuals, ministries, executive bodies, and occasionally the Legislature. These variations stemmed from constitutional, legal, and politico-administrative configurations.

### *Mexico: accession in the wake of NAFTA negotiations and the informal, personal nature of relations with the OECD*

In 1994, Mexico achieved a historic milestone by becoming the first non-developed nation to join the OECD. The culmination of the Cold War and the ascent of an increasingly globalized economic environment defined this geopolitical context. Amidst this evolving global landscape, the OECD aimed to consolidate its position by forging stronger connections with emerging economies and expanding its membership. Mexico, alongside South Korea, came out as promising candidates. However, Mexico had already demonstrated its substantive engagement with various OECD committees dating back to the 1980s.

The country had undergone significant processes of financial and trade liberalization since Miguel de la Madrid's government (1982-1988) (Lustig 1994). During Carlos

Salinas' tenure (1988-1994), Mexico negotiated NAFTA, promising increased commercial significance and heightened attractiveness for foreign investments (Zomosa Signoret 2005). The momentum for liberal reforms surged, envisioning the nation's 'modernization' through structural changes (Arellano 1994; Rozenthal 1993). Paradoxically, Mexico's accession to the OECD, although linked to NAFTA due to United States pressure, aimed to diversify relations beyond the American sphere, fostering closer ties with European nations. Furthermore, it garnered support from a globally esteemed institution for its internal reform initiatives.

The roles of specific Mexican institutions during and after the accession process were neither well defined nor pre-emptively outlined. At that time, the OECD itself lacked clear guidelines for accession.<sup>1</sup> The United States' political support and economic influence played a pivotal role in Mexico's accession to the OECD. At the outset of the accession process, Mexico established a permanent representation tasked with handling OECD affairs at the Embassy of Mexico in Paris. Chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE), this delegation was responsible for coordinating activities across various government departments interested in leveraging the organization's technical and political resources. Mexico strategically engaged in committees it deemed more significant, deploying high-ranking officials and cultivating personal connections with OECD officials<sup>2</sup>, which emerged as a crucial factor in its selection as a potential member (Zomosa Signoret 2015).

Domestically, divergent perspectives existed between the SRE and the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Promotion (SECOFI), later restructured as the Ministry of Economy (SE) (Abella 1994). Salinas' foreign policy, as implemented by its diplomatic corps, remained more grounded in traditional principles than in the focal points of the president's modernization agenda. SECOFI and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) assumed roles concerning trade and financial liberalization. However, the Ministry of Finance played a leading role throughout Mexico's accession process and post-membership. This leadership originated from a political resolution and an appreciation of the global nature of the OECD (ENT001, interview by authors, 31 October 2022).

The Ministry of Finance retained the authority to appoint Mexico's representatives to the OECD, mandating them to hold ambassadorial status and receive ratification from Congress. The SRE sustained its responsibility to coordinate the engagement of other entities and ensure Mexico's alignment with the organization (ENT002, interview by authors, 01 November 2022). However, its role was not to draft statements and positions for peer reviews but rather to convey them based on information sourced from other ministries, contingent on the discussed topic, guided by the SHCP.

Commencing in 2013, the government of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) initiated a series of structural reforms. Anchored by a historic agreement among Mexico's three largest political parties, termed the 'Pact for Mexico,' this reform package stood out as the most ambitious among all OECD member countries (OECD 2017b). These reforms covered the energy, telecommunications, and broadcasting sectors, along with competition, fiscal, electoral, social security, justice, labour, education, and health systems. To

bolster these reforms, several constitutional amendments and foundational laws were enacted. These were complemented by secondary legislation and regulations overseeing the labour and product markets, competition policy, and tax system. Peña Nieto's administration aligned with Angel Gurría's tenure as Secretary-General of the OECD, during which the organization oversaw and supported the Mexican government in formulating, developing, and implementing these reforms (OECD 2017b).<sup>3</sup>

From an institutional standpoint, following Mexico's accession to the OECD, the country had to delineate distinct roles and responsibilities for its representatives dispatched to Paris. A key challenge encountered by Mexico's OECD office was identifying issues of particular relevance. Moreover, various cross-sector themes and committees were an additional challenge. The country's response was the formation of inter-ministerial groups tasked with aligning positions, fostering relationships between different committees, and formalizing connections and competencies (ENT002, interview by authors, 01 November 2022). The SRE oversaw some groups, while the SE managed others. These groups represent the unique approach of Mexico's engagement in committees, revealing an aspect of institutional experimentation carried out by a developing nation.

Starting in 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador's government revived initiatives for heightened state intervention, notably within the energy sector, where it reversed previous reforms and sought to regain control. Despite Obrador's administration advocating for a new economic model to replace neoliberalism, there were no alterations to Mexico's status of trade openness or the role of private capital. This was evident in the negotiation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USCMA), which replaced NAFTA in July 2020. Mexico remains one of the world's most open economies, upholding free trade agreements with over 48 countries. Apart from minor adjustments in labour conditions and rules of origin, the USCMA upheld previous arrangements concerning the movement of goods and capital among participant nations (Muno, Faust and Thunert 2022).

Under Obrador's administration, there was a notable shift in Mexico's engagement with the OECD and other international organizations. Following a presidential decision, Mexico's permanent mission to the OECD was reduced to approximately half of its representatives, and by 2022, only minimal representations of the Secretaries remained within the OECD. Concurrently, with the decrease in representation, the SRE assumed a more prominent role in international relations overall, including its approach to the OECD. Influential Mexican observers, pivotal in both the accession process and subsequent participation in the organization, interpret these changes as signalling a diminishing influence and impact for Mexico vis-à-vis the OECD (ENT001, interview by authors, 31 October 2022).

### *Chile: accession as an instrument for the consolidation of trade openness*

On 7 May 2010, Chile secured its position as the 31<sup>st</sup> member of the OECD, the first South American nation to attain full membership in the organization. Unlike Mexico, Chile, upon joining the OECD, did not face the necessity of withdrawing from the G77

(Contreras Tacilla 2018).<sup>4</sup> The country underwent an extensive accession process, one of the first countries subjected to a comprehensive and intricate accession roadmap.

Chile had held observer status in the OECD since 1993, engaging in the OECD/Dynamic Non-Member Economies Policy Dialogue alongside Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil (Chile 2021). In this capacity, it actively participated in several OECD committees (Sáez 2019), integrating the initial policy recommendations and tools into its efforts toward international integration. By 1996, Chile obtained observer status in the Trade Committee, followed by entry into the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises in 1997 (now the Investment Committee). Additionally, in 1998, it became affiliated with the OECD Development Centre. By 2007, Chile was actively engaged in 20 committees and working groups (Chile 2021).

This escalated involvement with the OECD aligned with Chile's economic liberalization process in the 1990s. During this phase, successive governments actively pursued the expansion of Chile's political and trade relationships, initially within Latin America and later extending to North America, Europe, and Asia. Economically, this period witnessed a unilateral reduction in tariffs, resulting in an extensive network of bilateral, multilateral, and plurilateral trade agreements (Méndez Salgado 2012). Therefore, Chile prioritized the OECD's agenda on trade liberalization. While aiming to enhance existing first-generation free trade agreements, the country sought to broaden their scope by incorporating additional disciplines, such as trade in services, and addressing new topics at the time, such as trade and environment, and trade and labour standards (Chile 2021). Notably, these initiatives were pursued in conjunction with fundamental sectors of the economy, including agriculture and fisheries. The measures promoting openness and international integration notably intensified in the 2000s, coinciding with Ricardo Lagos's administration (2000-2006), which prioritized institutional transformations and modernization through the State Reform and Modernization Project (Méndez Salgado 2012).

The formal application for OECD membership was submitted in November 2003 through a joint letter signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Soledad Alvear, and the Minister of Finance, Nicolás Eyzaguirre. Subsequently, various ministers participated in the OECD Council's Annual Ministerial Meeting (Chile 2021). The decision to expand the organization materialized on 16 May 2007, when the Council invited Chile, Slovenia, Estonia, Israel, and Russia to initiate negotiations for full membership (OECD 2007a). The roadmap for accession to the OECD Convention was approved by the Council on 30 November 2007 (OECD 2007b), an occasion that marked the formal beginning of the process.

The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversaw the accession process, particularly through a unit initially named the Directorate General of International Economic Relations (DIRECON), now the Undersecretariat of International Economic Relations (SUBREI). A specific coordination function was established exclusively for managing the accession process, responsible for administration and task allocation. Subsequently, in March 2008, Karen Poniachik Pollack was officially appointed by the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs as the government's representative

for negotiating Chile's full membership to the OECD (Chile 2008). Prior to this role, Poniachik had served as the Minister of Mining from March 2006 to January 2008, concurrently holding chair positions on the boards of Codelco, Enap, and Enami. As the key figure in the OECD accession process, the coordinator reported to the Presidency, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Simultaneously, the position of Ambassador for relations with the OECD was established (ENT006, interview by authors, 29 November 2022).

In the initial stages of the accession process, the OECD secretariat communicated to Chile the necessity of implementing legal reforms or adjustments to enable the invitation to join the organization (Sáez 2019). Four critical reforms were outlined. The first focused on the liability of legal persons in cases involving bribery of public officials (Merino 2010). The second reform centred on the exchange of tax information, enabling the National Revenue Service to share bank account information with the tax administrations of OECD member countries. The third reform aimed at revising the corporate governance of Codelco, the Chilean state-owned copper mining entity, to align it with international standards for managing public enterprises (Morandé and Díaz 2010). The fourth involved reforming private corporate governance, introducing a new law that strictly prohibited conducting share transactions when in possession of insider information (Morandé and Díaz 2010). Implementing these initiatives garnered broad support within the government and Congress for Chile's integration into the organization. Consequently, there was no need to establish a dedicated legislative committee for OECD matters, leading to an ad hoc approach in managing legal reforms (ENT006, interview by authors, 29 November 2022).

In September 2008, Chile presented the initial *memorandum* to the OECD, outlining its stance on the organization's legal frameworks, spanning 24 areas delineated across 22 chapters (Chile 2021). All proposals received approval, accompanied by comments and requests specifying implementation timelines (Sáez 2019). Subsequently, on 15 December 2009, during Michelle Bachelet's tenure (2006-2010), the OECD Council formally extended an invitation to Chile to join the organization as a full member. The signing ceremony for the accession agreement occurred on 11 January 2010, followed by the Chilean Congress's ratification of the agreement on March 10 of the same year (Méndez Salgado 2012).

After finalizing the accession process, coordination responsibility shifted back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hosting a Division dedicated to G20 and OECD matters within the SUBREI. Currently, an ambassador supervises Chile's permanent representation to the OECD, acting on behalf of the President of the Republic and the State of Chile. The Ambassador primary mandate involves fostering the Chile-OECD relationship, ensuring Chile's active participation and engagement across Committees and Working Groups, advocating for Chilean positions in the diverse activities of the Organization (Chile 2021).

## *Colombia: accession as a personal project of President Juan Manuel Santos and a centralized process*

In 2020 and 2021, Colombia and Costa Rica, respectively, became the two latest countries to join the organization. Despite their close temporal proximity and shared characteristics, the accession processes of these nations possess unique features, particularly in their institutional frameworks. Colombia's accession process, similar to Mexico's, stemmed from its distinct relationship with the United States, following the free trade agreement between both nations, in force since 2012. The United States support was contingent upon Colombia embracing new commitments in trade, intellectual property, and labour matters, showcasing the United States interest in securing substantial concessions from new members to drive forward a 'WTO plus' agenda, which had stalled within the multilateral domain (Crane 2021; Mello 2020).

Colombia expressed its interest in joining the OECD in 2010 during Juan Manuel Santos's presidency (2010-2018). On 24 January 2011, it formally requested initiation of the necessary process from its members. Colombia's chief motivations for seeking OECD membership were multifaceted. Firstly, it aimed to reshape the country's international perception and position itself as an open economy. Secondly, domestically, it sought validation for an agenda of internal reforms by seeking expert advice and embracing best practices, pushing for politically challenging reforms for domestic approval. Lastly, joining the organization aligned with Colombia's commitment to engaging in multilateral relations (Castro Alegría and González 2016), encompassing a trade and investment agenda involving Colombia's participation in Unasur, the Pacific Alliance, the CPTPP, and various bilateral trade agreements (Crane 2021).

In contrast to Mexico and Chile, which had established relations with various OECD committees before their accession processes, Colombia had no prior engagement with the organization (ENT002, interview by authors, 01 November 2022). Immediate efforts were necessary to align Colombia with the OECD. In early 2011, President Santos personally appointed Catalina Crane Arango as directly responsible for the 'OECD process' (Velarde 2022). She was among the high advisers within Santos's immediate circle in the Administrative Department of the Presidency and, since the beginning of his term in 2010, had overseen the High Council for Competitiveness and Public-Private Management. Colombia's accession process, to a certain extent, was a central project of Santos' government, with Catalina Crane serving as the coordinator and a trusted figure of the presidency.

Catalina Crane led a task force, which, until 2013, solely comprised one subordinate access coordinator. According to Velarde (2022), they initially advocated three courses of action: i) engaging with ten OECD technical committees; ii) formally adopting a significant array of the organization's legal instruments; and iii) consistently pursuing political and diplomatic efforts to secure OECD member support for Colombia's accession. Regarding the first task, within domains aligned with the selected committees, the country sought OECD's assessments concerning the status of domestic public policies and

established technical teams inside their respective ministries (Velarde 2022). The second task aimed to demonstrate Colombia's commitment to aligning with OECD norms. The focus centred on accession through the organization's central instruments, including the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. This involved revisiting anti-corruption legislation by subscribing to the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and active engagement in the Global Forum for Transparency and Exchange of Tax Information. Multiple peer reviews and technical visits occurred between 2011 and 2012, culminating in the formal accession invitation extended in May 2013 (Crane 2021).

After receiving the invitation and presenting the roadmap, technical analyses began, involving 23 OECD's committees, as the country prepared the Initial Memorandum. The Presidency led this initiative, under the supervision of the Secretary-General to the President, with regular briefings to the Council of Ministers regarding the process's progress. A task force, comprising senior representatives from each ministry, consistently convened and collaborated with a team stationed at the Embassy in Paris. Catalina Crane and the access coordination facilitated technical dialogues with committees established since 2010, refining the former operational approach and shaping the Initial Memorandum.

Recognizing the drive to join the OECD as a 'subject at the heart of the Presidency' significantly eased cross-departmental collaboration and the acceptance by ministers and officials of the strong and visible centralizing role of Crane and the Access Coordinator (Velarde 2022: 16). The engagement of the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Foreign Affairs adeptly navigated critical junctures, including congressional law approvals and diplomatic interventions (Crane 2021). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs primarily directed bilateral engagements and coordinated interactions among domestic agencies. In Paris, collaboration with the OECD occurred through the office affiliated with the Colombian Embassy, which featured a team directly associated with the Presidency.

Seven months after the Roadmap's approval, the Colombian government presented the Initial Memorandum to the OECD in March 2014. The country embarked on a series of domestic reforms. The most contentious ones revolved around labour and justice system reforms, due to issues like violence against unionists and labour relations' informality. Labour reform posed a significant obstacle to Colombia's accession, necessitating separate negotiations with OECD members. Additional reforms encompassed changes in the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises, anti-corruption regulations, and policies addressing trade and environmental aspects related to chemical products handling (OECD 2018).

After the roadmap's approval in Paris, Crane spearheaded the accession process, maintaining direct contact with the OECD administration and member country representatives, and had direct access to President Santos. In Bogotá, at the Presidency, María Lorena Gutiérrez, then High Adviser for Good Governance, assumed Crane's role in overseeing ministries and national teams' work. Despite the extensive negotiations, the decision was made to retain a relatively small central leadership for the campaign, divided between the OECD Representation Office in Paris, under Crane's leadership, and the

Presidency's High Council on Good Governance, led by María Lorena Gutiérrez (Velarde 2022). The former aimed to pre-empt potential negotiation blocks and issues, coordinating with the Presidency and Ministries for diplomatic and political pressures on member country representatives when technical negotiations did not suffice. Simultaneously, in Colombia, the Presidency-based team continued to coordinate responsible members of the technical team, engage in meetings with OECD teams, and review necessary document versions for negotiation progress (Velarde 2022).

In a process characterized by Velarde (2022: 61) as 'lateral adaptation and vertical oversight,' Colombia embraced 'a low level of hierarchical formalization within teams and predominantly relied on mutual adjustment as coordination mechanisms.' To prevent competition, both Crane and her successors did not occupy formal ministerial positions and lacked vertical sectoral authority; they were part of the department overseeing institutional coordination (Velarde 2022). Consequently, it is clear that the Colombian process, akin to the Mexican one albeit in different contexts, featured a significant political aspect and demonstrated a limited degree of institutionalization.

### *Costa Rica: three different governments and the accession to OECD seen as a technical and trade issue*

Costa Rica embarked on its accession process in 2010, a journey reminiscent of Chile's. Both nations endured extensive accession procedures, encountering political and technical obstacles on national and international fronts. In contrast to Colombia, Costa Rica garnered substantial political backing within the OECD, not solely from the United States but also from certain European nations. However, concurrent with the potential accession of other members such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Romania to the OECD, Costa Rica's entry confronted challenges due to differences in perspectives regarding the organization's expansion. The United States advocated for a more restrained expansion, leading to complexities in Costa Rica's journey to accession (Mello 2020) (ENT005, interview by authors, 16 November 2022).

The country formalized its request to join the OECD in 2012, initiating closer collaboration with the organization by 2013. After a prolonged duration, in May 2020, President Carlos Alvarado and Secretary-General Ángel Gurría signed the agreement outlining Costa Rica's accession to the OECD Convention. By May 2021, the country became the 38<sup>th</sup> member of the OECD after depositing the necessary instrument and finalizing the accession process. This journey unfolded across three distinct administrations led by Laura Chinchilla, Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera, and Carlos Alvarado Quesada. During Solís Rivera's tenure (2014-2018), Costa Rica received the formal invitation, initiating an analysis of the country's admission conditions by 22 evaluation committees. The momentum continued throughout Alvarado Quesada's administration (2018-2022), where achieving accession by 2020 was a political priority, prominently featured on the agenda of Congress and State Ministers (ENT007, interview by authors, 29 November 2022).

President Alvarado's affiliation with Laura Chinchilla's party (2010-2014), the initiator of the accession process during her tenure, lent a distinct political narrative to the agenda (ENT007, interview by authors, 29 November 2022). Nonetheless, the significance attributed to joining the OECD persisted across governments spanning diverse political ideologies, underscoring entry into the organization as a state policy rather than a mere governmental pursuit (ENT007, interview by authors, 29 November 2022). Across the three administrations, a consensus emerged on the expected benefits of OECD accession, owing to the alignment between the organization's agenda and the national political trajectory. During transitions between administrations, the technical team overseeing the accession maintained a strategic plan to introduce the OECD's agenda to the incoming government, emphasizing the institution's significance for the succeeding administration (ENT007, interview by authors, 29 November 2022).

In the process of implementing the country's regulatory framework update, the Legislative Assembly played a pivotal role alongside the Executive (Mora Martínez and Arce Portuguez 2022). At the beginning of the accession process, the Legislative branch established an OECD Special Committee comprising various political parties tasked with overseeing necessary legislative reforms. Its members actively engaged in the accession, participating in parliamentary meetings with the OECD and holding discussions with the OECD Secretary on domestic legislation (ENT007, interview by authors, 29 November 2022). Interviews consistently underscored the Legislature's involvement from the outset as crucial to the process – a distinct aspect of the Costa Rican approach not evident in other analysed cases. Following the signing of the Accession Agreement and the OECD Convention, the approval of 14 specific laws ensued, precipitating subsequent adaptations by public institutions, described as a 'catalyst for State reforms' by the Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (COMEX), Andrés Valenciano (Costa Rica 2021).

Apart from the imperative legislative reforms, a significant portion of the other reforms had an administrative nature. Costa Rica had already integrated some aspects of the OECD framework and had a certain level of prominence in specific organizational spheres, notably in environmental matters (ENT003, interview by authors, 01 November 2022). However, the country embarked on bolstering its economic performance, focusing on three core elements: macroeconomic and organizational stability; policies promoting inclusivity; and fortifying the bedrock of the economy to enable sustained and sustainable long-term growth. Furthermore, Costa Rica underwent banking system reforms entailing the Central Bank's autonomy, establishing a deposit guarantee mechanism, reinforcing financial regulation and oversight, information exchange protocols, and authorization for the establishment of agencies in the country (UNDP 2020).

Within the Executive branch, COMEX took the lead in the accession process to the OECD and sustained a continual presence at the organization. Leveraging its legal mandate regarding the country's economic affairs, COMEX orchestrated coordination among various ministries and competent institutions. The Ministry had an extensive history of national engagement across diverse public and private spheres, actively participating in

bilateral, regional, and multilateral negotiations, managing agreements, and representing the country in international negotiations and forums (González 2020).

To navigate the OECD accession intricacies, COMEX established a specialized team that harmonized the agendas of more than 40 ministries and internal bodies throughout the process. Each entity developed documents and initiatives aligned with their specific legal mandates. Reporting to the Advisory Council on Foreign Trade, this council consisted of the Minister of Foreign Trade, the Minister of Economy, Industry, and Trade, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, and representatives from the private sector.

After accession, debates emerged regarding membership coordination. Ultimately, the Ministry of Foreign Trade maintained its coordination role, drawing upon expertise acquired from nearly a decade of negotiations with the OECD. The representation in Paris, formerly under Costa Rica's Permanent Delegation to the WTO, transitioned to a permanent representative affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Trade, tasked with aligning responsibilities with the Organization (González 2020).

González (2020) seeks to clarify the centrality of COMEX based on its unique functions, which other ministries in the country cannot fulfil. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship possesses capabilities in shaping and executing the country's foreign policy, Costa Rica approaches OECD-related matters from a more technical and commercial standpoint rather than properly diplomatic. Conversely, while the Ministry of Planning focuses on developmental issues, it lacks the requisite international projection and experience, and the Ministry of Finance primarily concentrates on fiscal matters.

COMEX has shifted its institutional role towards empowering national institutions to engage actively in the governance structures of the OECD, particularly in the Council, Executive Committee, and other relevant organs of the institution. In a bid to align collaborative efforts with the organization and domestic policies, an Advisory Council was instituted to oversee OECD-related matters. This council comprises representatives from the Presidency, the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Policy, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, and the Central Bank (Costa Rica 2021). Chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, this committee convenes annually to deliberate on OECD participation and its alignment with the national development plan (ENT007, interview by authors, 29 November 2022).

Table 1. Comparative characteristics for OECD's accession

	<b>Political and/or economic context</b>	<b>Objectives pursued</b>	<b>Key institutions and participants</b>	<b>Domestic Reforms</b>	<b>Unique features</b>
Mexico	Post-Cold War Accession to NAFTA	Trade and economic liberalization Diversification of trade relations Support for domestic reforms	Ministry of Finance (leadership) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (coordination)	Fiscal; financial; electoral; competition; regulatory; energy, telecom and broadcasting sectors	Low degree of institutionalization Inter-ministerial groups
Chile	OECD's enlargement in the 2000s	Trade and economic liberalization Diversification of trade relations	Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs through a specific unit (DIRECON, now SUBREI)	Anti-corruption; tax; corporate governance of state-owned companies (specially Codelco)	Specific coordination group to manage the accession process Centralized coordination process
Colombia	Close political and trade relationship with the United States United States-Colombia TPA	Trade and economic liberalization Investment attraction Support for domestic reforms	Presidency and task force comprising representatives from each Ministry	Labour and justice reforms; corporate governance of state-owned companies; anti-corruption and environmental policies	No prior engagement with the OECD Accession directly linked to the Presidency Centralized coordination process Low level of hierarchical formalization
Costa Rica	Simultaneous candidacy with other LA countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Peru) Divergent members' views on the expansion	Trade and economic liberalization Internationalization strategy and investment attraction	Ministry of Foreign Trade (leadership and coordination)	Financial regulation and oversight of banking system	Ministry of Foreign Trade OECD Special Committee in the Legislative Branch to facilitate legislative reforms

## Conclusion

The OECD's expansion has evolved significantly, revealing unique trajectories with each new member's accession, navigating intricate technicalities and political exigencies. The process remains technical and political at the same time. The organization's multifaceted agenda has prolonged accession procedures, resulting in more elaborate and stringent pathways, particularly embraced by Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica. Moreover, political pressures, deviating from formal prerequisites, have influenced the process, notably the demands set by the United States for Colombia's accession. Consequently, aspiring nations pursuing OECD membership progressively necessitate the development of increasingly complex institutional frameworks, shaping a process with distinctive features tailored to each scenario. A consistent theme across these instances has been the focalization of the process around figures closely associated with the Presidency, coupled with substantial influence from economic teams in steering the course, despite the original roles ascribed to Foreign Ministries.

Mexico, as the pioneering developing country in the OECD during the 1990s, embarked on an accession process lacking clear delineations. Instead, it bore a distinctly political character, receiving significant support from the United States alongside essential reforms for NAFTA implementation. Personal relationships between Mexican government representatives and OECD officials played a pivotal role. Internally, despite coordination by the SRE, the Ministry of Finance took the lead, appointing Mexico's representatives to the OECD and shaping economic stances. Over time, Mexico's relationship with the OECD evolved, becoming more institutionalized, with clearer delineations of roles and responsibilities for representatives within the organization.

The Chilean accession process unfolded along a more extensive and intricate trajectory compared to Mexico's, remarkably veering away from a prominently political nature, circumventing the country's need to withdraw from the G77 as a precondition for entry. Managed jointly by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Chilean process operated through a specialized unit within SUBREI. Karen Poniachik Pollack assumed a central coordinating role specifically for the accession, entrusted with organizational and negotiation responsibilities on behalf of the government. Upon conclusion, coordination authority shifted back to the Ministry of Foreign Relations, housing a dedicated Division within SUBREI focused on G20 and OECD affairs.

Colombia and Costa Rica, the remaining two Latin American nations, positioned themselves for OECD entry by the late 2000s. Unlike Mexico and Chile, Colombia lacked pre-existing connections with OECD committees. Structures were established progressively throughout the process, under the guidance of President Juan Manuel Santos, who viewed it as a pivotal Presidential initiative. Catalina Crane Arango, a highly trusted High Counsellor appointed by Santos, spearheaded Colombia's efforts. In Colombia's case, these attributes facilitated streamlined cross-sectoral collaboration and garnered ministerial and official approval for the process's robust centralization. Crane led a streamlined team, coordinating actions in Paris with the OECD and its members, and domestically, operating within the Presidential realm.

The Costa Rican accession process unfolded across three distinct governing periods. Not highlighted as a primary agenda during any specific presidential term, accession to the OECD was approached in the country as a technical and trade matter, less entangled in domestic and international political controversies, overseen by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Worship. Costa Rica chose to institutionalize the bodies managing accession, necessitating legislative amendments. Two distinct facets stand out compared to Mexico, Chile, and Colombia. Firstly, the inherent nature of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Worship and its key role in the process. Secondly, the crucial significance of the OECD Legislative Committee within Congress, tasked with formulating complex frameworks and securing consensus among political factions to implement regulatory reforms.

Shaping the narrative for accession, the idea of OECD membership resonated across the four scrutinized nations as part of a broader agenda of economic and trade liberalization, ultimately leading to a network of international trade and investment agreements. In this context, the collective expectation was that membership would send a positive signal to global investors, catalyzing domestic reforms and driving ambitious initiatives for institutional transformation and ‘State modernization.’

## Acknowledgment

The article is a result of the research ‘OECD Structures – References for Brazil,’ conducted as part of the scope of the Executive Cooperation Program between the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) on ‘Public policies for the economic, social and environmental development of Brazil and Latin America guided by United Nations’ 2030 Agenda and the proposed challenges for the Brazilian nation from the Institute for Applied Economic Research.’

## Notes

- 1 The document ‘Framework for the Consideration of Prospective Members,’ sanctioned in 2017, formalized the mechanism for access and membership. It is available at <https://www.oecd.org/mcm/documents/C-MIN-2017-13-EN.pdf> [Accessed on 21 November 2022].
- 2 Several names referenced in the literature are: i) Daniel Dultzin, an ambassador involved in Mexico’s 1989 negotiation of external debt; ii) Carlos Hurtado, the first permanent representative of Mexico to the OECD in 1997 and the Undersecretary of Expenditures at the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP); iii) Francisco Suárez Dávila, appointed as ambassador to the OECD in 1998; and iv) Carlos Elizondo, serving as the ambassador to the OECD from 2004 to 2006. Ángel Gurría, former Secretary-General of the OECD, acted as a pivotal link between Mexico and the OECD. Gurría held ministerial positions as Mexico’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance in the 1990s.
- 3 Mexico’s Representatives at the OECD during this period of extensive reforms argue that, beginning in 2016, Mexico started to hold a significant position within the organization. They successfully proposed and even led discussions on relevant topics for developing nations on the OECD’s agenda. Mexico suggested ministerial meetings focusing on small and medium-sized enterprises and took charge of these discussions within the organization. Furthermore, it led conversations regarding the digital economy, recognized as a pervasive theme across numerous OECD committees.
- 4 Upon joining the OECD, both Mexico and South Korea were formally required to withdraw from the G77, a group of which they were founding members. This reflected the perspective that belonging to these groups represented mutually exclusive strategies’ (Mello 2020).

## References

- Abella Armengol, G. 1994. 'La política exterior en la administración de Carlos Salinas de Gortari: la propuesta del cambio estructural.' *Relaciones Internacionales* 15 (62): 53-70.
- Alves, A G M P (ed.). 2020. 'O Brasil na OCDE.' *Boletim de Economia e Política Internacional* 28: 1-160.
- Arellano, L. 1994. 'El ingreso a la OCDE.' *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior* 44: 190-198.
- Azzi, D. 2021. 'Subordinação pela adesão: o pleito do Brasil a membro pleno da OCDE.' In G Maringoni, G R Schutte and T Berringer (org.), *As Bases da Política Externa Bolsonaroista: Relações Internacionais em um mundo em transformação*. Santo André: EdUFABC, pp. 61-74.
- Baumann, R. 2021. 'O que esperar da membresia na OCDE?' *Revista Tempo do Mundo* 25: 29-50.
- Braga, C P. 2021. 'A adesão à OCDE: muito barulho por nada?' *Revista Tempo do Mundo*, 25: 93-108.
- Brasil. 2021. Conselho Brasil-OCDE. *Relatório Agosto de 2021*. Estado de Preparação e o acompanhamento do futuro processo de acesso do Brasil à OCDE. At: [https://www.gov.br/casacivil/pt-br/assuntos/ocde/sobre-a-ocde-1/2021-08-26\\_\\_\\_anexo\\_c\\_relatorio\\_de\\_acompanhamento\\_cg\\_br\\_ocde\\_\\_\\_aprovado\\_11cg.pdf](https://www.gov.br/casacivil/pt-br/assuntos/ocde/sobre-a-ocde-1/2021-08-26___anexo_c_relatorio_de_acompanhamento_cg_br_ocde___aprovado_11cg.pdf) [Accessed on 12 November 2022].
- Brasil. 2022. Ministério da Economia. *Brasil encaminha Memorando Inicial à OCDE*. At: <https://www.gov.br/economia/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2022/outubro/brasil-encaminha-memorando-inicial-a-ocde> [Accessed on 12 November 2022].
- Castro Alegría, R and P González. 2016. 'Las organizaciones de la arquitectura global y el posconflicto colombiano: el caso de la cooperación de la ONU, el Banco Mundial y la OCDE.' In E Patrana Buelvas and H Gehring, *Política exterior colombiana: escenarios y desafíos en el posconflicto*. Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, pp. 293-315.
- Chile. 2021. *Chile en la OCDE: 10 años de integración*. Santiago: SUBREI, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile.
- Chile. 2008. *Karen Poniachik es la nueva representante del Gobierno de Chile en las negociaciones de ingreso a la OCDE*. At: [https://www.minrel.gob.cl/minrel\\_old/site/artic/20080727/pags/20080727195626.html](https://www.minrel.gob.cl/minrel_old/site/artic/20080727/pags/20080727195626.html) [Accessed on 08 November 2022].
- Chessé, A and A Verdun. 2023. 'International Political Economy.' In F Francesco and C M Radaelli (eds.), *The Elgar Companion to the OECD*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 23-36.
- Clifton, J. and D Díaz-Fuentes. 2011. 'From 'Club of the Rich' to 'Globalisation a la carte'? Evaluating Reform at the OECD.' *Global Policy*, 2 (3): 300-311.
- Clifton, J and D Díaz-Fuentes. 2014. 'The OECD and "The Rest": Analyzing the Limits of Policy Transfer', *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 16 (3): 249-265.
- Contreras Tacilla, J A. 2018. El impacto del ingreso a la OCDE sobre la política exterior de México y Chile. Dissertação de Mestrado. Academia Diplomática del Perú Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Peru.
- Costa Rica. 2021. *Firmada ley de aprobación del Acuerdo de Adhesión y de la Convención de la OCDE*. At <https://www.presidencia.go.cr/comunicados/2021/05/firmada-ley-de-aprobacion-del-acuerdo-de-adhesion-y-de-la-convencion-de-la-ocde/> [Accessed on 08 January 2023].
- Cozendey, C M. 2017. 'O pedido de acesso do Brasil à OCDE: Aceder a quê? Aceder por quê?' *Revista Brasileira de Comércio Exterior* 132: 26-32.

- Crane, C. 2021. 'El Camino de Colombia a la OCDE: Por Qué, Para Qué y Cómo Se Hizo.' *Revista Tempo do Mundo* 25: 133-154.
- Davis, C. 2016. *More than a rich country club: membership conditionality and institutional reform in the OECD*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Eccleston, R. 2011. 'The OECD and global economic governance.' *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 65 (2): 243-255.
- ENT001. 2022. Virtual interview with former member of the Mexican Delegation to the OECD and former Director of the Mexican Secretariat of Economy by L S Tasquetto, M F P Fernandes and M F Azevedo. São Paulo, 31 October.
- ENT002. 2022. Virtual interview with former member of the Colombian Embassy at the OECD by L S Tasquetto, M F P Fernandes and M F Azevedo. 01 November.
- ENT003. 2022. Virtual interview with international trade lawyer from Costa Rica by L S Tasquetto, M F P Fernandes and M F Azevedo. 01 November.
- ENT004. 2022. Virtual interview with former member of the Mexican Delegation to the OECD by L S Tasquetto, M F P Fernandes and M F Azevedo. 14 November.
- ENT005. 2022. Virtual interview with former Minister of State of Costa Rica by L S Tasquetto and M F Azevedo. 16 November.
- ENT006. 2022. Virtual interview with representatives of the Undersecretariat for International Economic Relations of Chile by L S Tasquetto. 29 November.
- ENT007. 2022. Virtual interview with former civil servant at the Ministry of Foreign Trade of Costa Rica by M F Azevedo. 29 November.
- Godinho, R O. 2018. *A OCDE em rota de adaptação ao cenário internacional: perspectivas para o relacionamento do Brasil com a Organização*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.
- González, A. 2020. *Organización institucional para apoyar la participación efectiva de Costa Rica en la OCDE*. San José: Academia de Centroamérica.
- Lead University and Consejo de Promoción de la Competitividad. 2022. *Diálogos de política pública Costa Rica: Un año después de su incorporación a la OCDE*. San José: Editorial ULEAD.
- Leimgruber, M and M Schmelzer. 2023. 'The historical transformations of the OECD' In F Francesco and C M Radaelli (eds.), *The Elgar Companion to the OECD*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 9-22.
- Lustig, N. 1994. *Mexico: Hacia la reconstrucción de una economía*. México: FCE.
- Mahon, R and S McBride. 2008. *The OECD and Transnational Governance*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Mello, F C. 2020. 'The OECD enlargement in Latin America and the Brazilian candidacy', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 63 (2): 1-17.
- Mello, F C. 2022. 'The OECD enlargement in Latin America: domestic policies, foreign policy orientations and global governance'. Paper delivered at Sixth Global International Studies Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 15-17 July.
- Méndez Salgado, C M. 2012. *Proceso de Chile para su ingreso a la Organización para la Cooperación y Desarrollo Económico (OCDE): impacto en la modernización del estado y de la gestión pública*. Master dissertation. Universidad Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, Chile.

- Merino, J I. 2010. 'Impacto jurídico del ingreso de Chile a la OCDE', *Anuario de Derecho Público UDP* 1: 319-329.
- Mora Martínez, E and R Arce Portuguese. 2022. *Costa Rica en la OCDE: Análisis del nuevo escenario para su desarrollo económico y social*. San Pedro: Universidad de Costa Rica, Centro de Investigación y Capacitación en Administración Pública.
- Morandé, F and J D Díaz. 2010. 'Chile en el Club de los Países Desarrollados: Beneficios, Oportunidades y Desafíos del Ingreso a la OCDE'. In J E Cheyre, J M Olivares Tramón and N Rodríguez García, *Chile en el club de los países desarrollados*. Santiago: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, pp. 17-32.
- Muno, W, J Faust and M Thunert. 2022. *Mexico Report: Sustainable Governance Indicators*. Bertelsmann Stiftung: Gütersloh.
- Oliveira, O P. 2023. 'Brazil: Cooperation, policy transfer and resistance.' In F Francesco and C M Radaelli (eds.), *The Elgar Companion to the OECD*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 221-231.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. 2004. *A Strategy for Enlargement and Outreach: Report by the Chair of the Heads of Delegation Working Group on the Enlargement Strategy and Outreach, Ambassador Seiichiro Noburu*. Paris.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. 2006. *Resolution to Establish a Mechanism to Identify Countries for Potential Accession and Countries for Enhanced Engagement with the OECD*, Paris.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. 2007a. *A general procedure for future accessions*. Paris.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. 2007b. *Council Resolution on Enlargement and Enhanced Engagement*. Paris.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. 2007c. *Roadmap for the Accession of Chile to the OECD Convention*. Paris.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. 2011. *50th Anniversary Vision Statement*. Paris.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. 2017a. *Report of the Chair of the Working Group on the Future Size and Membership of the Organisation to Council - Framework for the Consideration of Prospective Members*. Paris.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. 2017b. *Towards a Stronger and More Inclusive Mexico: An Assessment of Recent Policy Reforms, Better Policies Series*. Paris.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. 2019. *Making OECD Standards and Policies Count on a Global Scale*. Paris.
- United Nations Development Programme [PNUD]. 2020. *Costa Rica compartilha com Brasil experiência de adesão à OCDE*. At: <https://www.undp.org/pt/brazil/news/costa-rica-compartilha-com-brasil-experi%C3%Aancia-de-ades%C3%A3o-%C3%A0-ocde> [Accessed on 17 April 2023].
- Rozenthal, A. 1993. *La política exterior de México en la era de la modernidad*. México: FCE, 1993.
- Ruggie, J G. 1982. 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.' *International Organization*, 36 (2): 379-415.

Sáez, R. 2019. 'La OCDE y el ingreso de Chile'. *Estudios Internacionales* 33 (166): 93-112.

Velarde, J C C. 2022. *Entrando para o Clube: a gestão de campanhas de políticas públicas: o caso do ingresso da Colômbia à OCDE (2011-2018)*. Brasília: Enap.

Woodward, R. 2010. 'The OECD and Economic Governance: Invisibility and Impotence?' In K Martens and A P Jakobi (eds.), *Mechanisms of OECD Governance: International Incentives for National Policy Making?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 53-74.

Woodward, R. 2022. *The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)*. New York: Routledge.

Zomosa Signoret, A. 2005. *La participación de México en la OCDE*. México: El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Internacionales.

## About the authors

**Lucas da Silva Tasquetto** is a Professor of International Relations at the Federal University of ABC (UFABC). He is the coordinator of the working group on trade, business, and investments of the Jean Monnet Module, hosted by the Brazil-European Union Institute of FECAP, and of the working group on international trade of the Observatory of Foreign Policy and International Insertion of Brazil (OPEB), at UFABC. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the Institute of International Relations of the University of São Paulo (USP). He was a postdoctoral researcher at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and held research positions at the King's College London and at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas School of Economics.

**Magali Favaretto Prieto Fernandes** is a Ph.D Candidate in Law & Development at Fundação Getúlio Vargas São Paulo (FGV Law School) and currently a researcher at the Center for Global Trade and Investment (CCGI) at Fundação Getúlio Vargas School of Economics, a WTO Chair in Brazil. She holds an *LL.M* in International Legal Studies from Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, DC and an *LL.B* in Law and Social Sciences from University of São Paulo Faculty of Law, São Paulo, Brazil. She received the Mario Henrique Simonsen full scholarship from FGV Law School and has been financially supported by the Postgraduate Support Program for Private Education Institutions from the Coordination of Superior Level Staff Improvement (CAPES-PROSUP).

**Milena da Fonseca Azevedo** is a Ph.D Candidate in Law at the University of Sao Paulo (USP), Brazil, and a fellow of the Ministry of Education's Program of Academic Excellence (CAPES/PROEX). She participates in the PhD Support Programme of the World Trade Organization and holds a Master's degree from USP and a Bachelor's in Law from FGV Sao Paulo Law School. Her research focuses on International Trade Law, digital trade, artificial intelligence, regulatory standards, and investment. She is affiliated with the Center for Global Trade and Investment Studies (CCGI) at EESP-FGV and

contributes to the Global Law and Development Center (NDGD) at FGV São Paulo Law School. She is also an International Trade Lawyer.

## **Estruturas institucionais dos países latino-americanos para adesão e participação na OCDE**

**Resumo:** O artigo apresenta as estruturas institucionais implementadas por México, Chile, Colômbia e Costa Rica para o processo de acessão à Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento (OCDE). O estudo considera os contextos políticos e econômicos nos quais se deram a acessão de cada país, identificando as instituições e atores fundamentais ao processo, as principais reformas domésticas necessárias, e as especificidades de cada país, como inovações institucionais e adaptações procedimentais. Em cada um deles, foi possível verificar estruturas e ajustes institucionais únicos, com um protagonismo mais ou menos acentuado de determinados indivíduos e órgãos governamentais, a depender das configurações constitucionais, legais e político-administrativas. Sustentamos que, apesar das particularidades de cada processo, do ponto de vista institucional, decisões relativas à acessão e de coordenação giram em torno da Presidência e entidades correspondentes ao Ministério da Fazenda e ao Ministério de Relações Exteriores, com variações no grau de preponderância desses órgãos, sua liderança e papel de coordenação. O enquadramento do ingresso à OCDE como um tema de natureza majoritariamente técnico tende a justificar a centralidade dos Ministérios da Fazenda e de órgãos ligados à Presidência nos processos e, com isso, uma abordagem mais liberal e próxima à organização. Assim, a acessão à OCDE em geral complementa e/ou legitima processos de abertura comercial e de reformas estruturais, estimulando a consolidação de determinados agrupamentos dentro das instituições nacionais.

**Palavras-chave:** OCDE; América Latina; Chile; Colômbia; Costa Rica; México; instituições.

*Received on 27 April 2023 and approved for publication on 18 March 2024*



<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>