### Is Tunisian Trade Policy Pro-Poor?

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WTO Chairs Programme, Trade Employment and Poverty Alleviation Panel

May 26, 2016



# Outline

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Introduction			
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### Introduction

- Trade liberalization raises important distributional questions
- Tunisia has comparatively high level of tariffs and NTMs
- Level of protection rapidly declining
- Main channel: Change in prices
- Impact of tariffs comparatively low

Introduction			
Literature			

#### Similar Studies

 Porto (2006) introduces general methodology; Nicita (2009) evidence for Mexico, Nicita et al. (2014) for Sub-Saharan Africa; Ural Marchand (2012) for India

Tunisian Trade Policy

Minot et al. (2010) CGE model

Companion paper

 Baghdadi et al. (2016) estimate tariff pass-through in Tunisia to be about 10%

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Method		

# Method (Porto, 2006) I

Income-expenditure identity:

$$e^{h}\left(\mathbf{p}_{T},\mathbf{p}_{N},\bar{u}^{h}\right)=w^{h}+\varphi^{h}$$
 (1)

where:

- $\mathbf{p}_{\mathcal{T}}$  Price vector of tradeables
- $\mathbf{p}_N$  Price vector of non-tradeables
- $\bar{u}^h$  Constant household utility
- $w^h$  Household wages
- $\varphi^h$  Transfer (Compensating Variation, CV)



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Method		

# Method (Porto, 2006) II

Let  $\mathbf{p}_{\mathcal{T}} = \mathbf{p}_{\mathcal{T}}(\tau)$  and  $w^h = w^h(\tau)$ , where  $\tau$  is a vector of tariffs

**Counterfactual Question:** How high would  $\varphi^h$  have to be to leave household welfare  $(\bar{u}^h)$  unaffected from a change in tariffs  $(\tau)$ ?

1. The effect of tariffs & NTMs on prices

- ► Tariff: Quite low pass-through in Tunisia (ca. 10%) (Baghdadi et al., 2016)
- NTMs: Often subsidies/standards in Tunisia (Ghali et al., 2013). Pass-through elasticity: 21% (Baghdadi et al., 2016)

$$\frac{\Delta\varphi_{hpt}}{e_{ht}} = \sum_{k} \left( s_{hkt} \xi \frac{\Delta\tau_{kt}}{1 + \tau_{kt}} \right)$$
(2)

• where  $\xi = \frac{d \ln P_{kt}}{d \ln(1+\tau_{kt})}$  is the tariff pass-through, and  $s_{hkt}$  is the share of good k in household h's expenditure



Method		

# Method (Porto, 2006) III

- 2. The effect of tariffs on wages:
  - Mincerian wage equations:

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$$w_{ijt} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 \tau_{jt} + \lambda_2 (\tau_{jt} * SKILL_{it}) + \lambda_3 SKILL_{it}$$
  
+  $\beta_1 AGE_{it} + \beta_2 AGE_{it}^2 + \beta_I \mathbf{I}_{it} + \epsilon_{ijt}$  (3)

#### • Effect on $\varphi$ :

$$\frac{\Delta\varphi_{hwt}}{e_{ht}} = -\sum_{j} \left(\lambda_1 \mathbf{E} \mathbf{M}_{hjt} + \lambda_2 \mathbf{S} \mathbf{K}_{hjt}\right) \frac{\Delta\tau_{jt}}{\tau_{jt}}$$
(4)

where:

 $\begin{array}{l} \mathsf{EM}_{hjt} \quad \text{No. of earners in household } h \text{ working in} \\ & \text{industry } j \text{ in year } t. \\ \mathsf{SK}_{hjt} \quad \text{No. of skilled earners in household } h \text{ working in} \\ & \text{industry } j \text{ in year } t. \end{array}$ 

(a)

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		Method		

# Method (Porto, 2006) IV

Advantage: Parametrically agnostic approach. Merely 3 identities used:

- Income-expenditure identity
- Roy's Identity
- Shepard's Lemma

Disadvantage: Substitution effect is not captured: Composition of consumption basket fixed



	Data		
Data			

- Trade data (import shares): UN COMTRADE
- Tariffs: WITS
- NTM ad-valorem equivalents (AVE): Baghdadi et al. (2016)
- Household expenditure shares & household characteristics: INS Household Survey harmonized by ERF
  - Years of schooling unavailable. Definition of skilled labour: Secondary education or higher
  - Income not available. Occupations at ISIC 2-digit level
- Sectoral wages: INS. Combined with ISIC using author made concordance.



(a)

	Results	

## Mincerian wage equation

	(1)
VARIABLES	Robust OLS
Weighted tariff	-1.025***
-	[0.0920]
NTM (Ad-valorem equ.)	-0.529***
	[0.0619]
Weighted tariff*Skill dummy	-0.335***
	[0.0937]
NTM*Skill dummy	-0.157**
	[0.0625]
Skill dummy	0.0348**
	[0.0136]
Age	0.00153*
	[0.000782]
Age squared	-1.10e-05
	[6.93e-06]
Urban dummy	-0.00799*
	[0.00472]
Male dummy	0.000951
	[0.00363]
Constant	7.827***
	[0.0282]
Observations	9,820
R-squared	0.891
Industry FE	Yes
Time FE	Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in	n brackets.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.



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	Results	

Caveat: Based only on sectoral data

#### **Different Scenarios:**

Scenario 1: Tariffs are abolished ( $\Delta \tau_i = -\tau_i$ ,  $\forall i \in K, J$ )

Scenario 2: All types of NTMs are introduced for all products



	Results	

#### Scenario 1: Consumption effect



Note: author's elaboration using incomplete pass-through of 10%

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	Results	

#### Scenario 1: Earnings effect





Note: author's elaboration using coefficients from Mincerian wage equation

	Results	

#### Scenario 1: Total effect



Note: author's elaboration using coefficients from Mincerian wage equation and incomplete pass-through of 10%

	Results	

#### Scenario 2: Consumption effect



Note: author's elaboration using incomplete pass-through of 21%



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	Results	

#### Welfare effects by region



Note: author's elaboration using incomplete pass-through of 10%



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	Results	

#### Welfare effects by gender



Note: author's elaboration using incomplete pass-through of 10%

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### Alternative Pass-through (50%): Consumption Effect





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### Alternative Pass-through (50%): Total Effect



Note: author's elaboration using incomplete pass-through of 50%

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		Conlusion	
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# Conlusion

- Consumption effect of tariff reduction positive for all income levels
- The poor are more (negatively) affected by the existing tariff scheme (would benefit more from liberalization)
- Increase in NTMs uniform effect across distribution

Limitations:

- Wage data only sectoral
- No dynamic effects of trade policy (i.e. sectoral change)

		Conlusion	

# Thank you very much for your attention!



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